Thailand's Economic Problems

[Shilo 371]

This is the first of a three part opinion piece written by a Thai economist in the Bangkok Post.

 

http://www.bangkokpost.com/070607_News/07Jun2007_news22.php

 

Hardest hit will be the grassroots

 

The state of Thailand's economy appears rather worrisome and the near-term prospects do not look promising. The following is the first of a three-part article on the major economic problems and weaknesses

 

By CHET CHAOVISIDHA

 

On the face of it, the current situation pertaining to the economy of Thailand is not as severe as the 1997 financial meltdown and the economic collapse that followed. But the present predicament seems to be wider in scope. Why? Because in the 1997 crisis the real, financial and external sectors collapsed or were near collapse, and yet the public sector was reasonably strong and able to come to the rescue, pulling the whole economy back up on its feet, albeit with the financial assistance of a certain international financial institution. This time, all four sectors are simultaneously plagued with their own particular ills, some more serious than others, although the degree of severity in each individual sector may not be as great as those associated with the three troubled sectors in the previous 1997 crisis; yet some problems appear to be policy-resistant in nature (as will be elucidated).

 

Nevertheless, the situation has given rise to a great deal of concern, as it has already begun to affect the livelihood of a large portion of the Thai citizenry.

 

Of major significance is the political instability, manifest by incidents of rallies and protest demonstrations staged by various political and economically-affected groups, and the constant shaping of public opinion abroad against the present administration.

 

These destabilising activities undoubtedly contribute to the undermining of business and the general public's confidence. They give rise to the concomitant loss of investment incentives, which lead to deferrment of planned direct investment by foreign and domestic investors alike.

 

Adding to this, the impending general election, tentatively to be held at the end of the year, will bring with it probable changes in economic policy. The unknown factor, combined with the present government's misfiring of several policy actions, represents uncertainty and business risks which would prompt astute investors to put their long-term investment decisions on hold, at least for the time being.

 

Consequently, only a portion of replacement investment is being undertaken, along with the continuing investment committed earlier.

 

In the real sector, we are confronted with a number of difficulties. The farm sector is stricken with declining income and a corresponding fall in spending. In addition, it is saddled with a huge amount of household debt, a legacy from the consumption-driven growth policy of the previous administration which relied primarily on debt-creation, geared towards the farm sector and the lower middle class.

 

The platform was supported by government-owned banks and financial institutions in the form of debt-suspension, liberal lending and policy loans. It has led to the present situation, in which members of the farm sector are clamouring for higher prices for their produce, not only to cover their cost of production but also the burden of interest servicing and repayment of outstanding debts.

 

The previous government's free-spending and giveaway policy might have been appropriate at the beginning, during which time the economy required an exceptionally strong stimulative policy package to get it back on its feet. Unfortunately, overdoing it by continuing to pursue consumption-driven expansion in economic activities over the next several years of its tenure is the main reason for the farm sector's potential collapse of personal finance. And this will happen soon, as is generally expected, unless proper remedial policy actions are applied in time _ a task which, short of a vigorous support from the public sector's financial resources, cannot be accomplished simply by relying on income generated by current market-determined prices of farm products alone. On top of this, a number of local farm products have succumbed to intense competition from foreign farm imports, to the further detriment of farm income and spending and general economic activities in the farm sector. Saddled with huge debts coupled with declining earnings and slim prospects of future improvement in the economic conditions, the local farm sector will inevitably suffer severe economic hardship.

 

Aside from this, an increasing number of farm communities has been brought down to earth. They are becoming disillusioned; the realisation has gradually sunk in that they are being reduced to a poverty-stricken and debt-ridden class, in the wake of the departure of the previous administration along with its populist, giveaway policies. They are becoming distraught. All these factors can be seen as a potential incubator for widespread social unrest and political discontent, as already evidenced by the mounting incidence of protests by various local agriculture-related groups _ which can only add to foreign as well as local investment jitters.

 

The collateral damage associated with household debt has to do with salaried workers in the non-farm sectors, many of whom had previously overextended themselves financially by excessive borrowing and lavish spending.

 

This bad habit was made possible by the increasingly widespread use of bank and non-bank credit card facilities _ the number of credit cards jumped from 1.6 million to 8.2 million between 2000 and 2005 and to over 10 million in 2007.

 

These individuals are compelled to languish under constant pressure to meet their monthly interest servicing and partial loan repayments on time. The offshoot is that their workplace productivity and their employers' business performance suffers.

 

Some household debtors have turned to refinancing their outstanding debts by resorting to new sources of funds, usually at more restrictive terms. This practice is generally deemed undesirable and unsustainable, as there are limited sources of finance available and once these have become exhausted, refinancing must come to an end and the process will reverse itself, with legal proceedings and bankruptcies following suit.

 

In the manufacturing sector, numerous business units, especially the small and medium-sized, have already felt the impact of the declining overall economic activity and a sizeable number have gone belly up. Many more are expected to follow suit.

 

Only the large-scale industrial and commercial enterprises have so far managed to endure the currently unfavourable economic conditions and withstand the onslaught of foreign competition.

 

TO BE CONTINUED TOMORROW.

 

Chet Chaovisidha is an economist, a former MP for Bangkok and an economic adviser to several past governments.

 

Part II: The trouble with the strong baht phenomenon

 

 

 

http://www.bangkokpost.com/News/08Jun2007_news17.php

 

 

The trouble with the strong baht phenomenon

 

This second of a three-part article on the Thai economy deals with the troubles in the financial system and the effects of a strong baht

 

By CHET CHAOVISIDHA

 

Continuing from the first instalment on the state of the Thai economy published yesterday, we carry on with our investigation of the causes for the current state of economic malaise: The large-scale industrial and commercial enterprises are primarily supported by their superior technical know-how, strong financial position and more efficient management and operations, in a spirit congruous with the modern, knowledge-based business world.

 

The local retailing sector has virtually been clobbered by the foreign retailing chainstore giants, as witnessed by the disapperance of countless traditional local mom-and-pop stores all over the country.

 

While long-term merits and defects of this continuing displacement of the local small shops by the foreign retailing chainstore giants are still being debated, and further evidence is required to substantiate the claim that this situation will eventually lead to a long-term increase in efficiency in the retailing sector as a whole, with net positive benefits ultimately accruing to the economy _ the short-term prospect is quite clear, as evidenced by the loss of business, jobs and livelihood of a substantial proportion of the local retailing community previously engaged in this sector.

 

The tourism industry is also suffering a setback, as growth in this sector has not met earlier expectations, partly as a consequence of insurgency in the South, arson activities against schools in the Northeast and the threat of sporadic bombings in the central region and the capital.

 

Besides, this sector has also been most acutely plagued by the ''expansion without employment'' phenomenon, which ascribes expansion in output and income to increased productivity attributed to an advancement in technology and the utlisation of modern, labour-saving machinery and telecommunications equipment, especially in the high-technology service activities.

 

Hence the past several years have witnessed the expansion in service activities with correspondingly little or much less than a proportionate increase in employment in this sector _ a troublesome tendency, considering that this sector has traditionally been the most progressive and dynamic in its employment-creation capacity and ability to absorb new entrants into the labour force.

 

On top of all this, the real sector is also inflicted with the so-called ''household debt'' problem. Over the past several years, induced by the previous government's populist policies, household debts have increased tremendously.

 

On average, they exceed household income earnings by a staggering margin. Since most of these indebted households belong to the lower- and middle-income class and the grassroots echelon of society _ and their income-earning potential is well below the level required to meet their debt obligations _ the situation presents a serious problem for policy-makers.

 

Why? Because by its nature, this kind of problem becomes increasingly more difficult to deal with under recessionary conditions, as the current economic downturn tends to further aggravate the debtors' situation by putting their job security, income and livelihood at risk.

 

As an increasing number of households falls into this category, and as their debt burden accumulates with no prospect of improvement of income in sight, they will be likely to start calling upon the authorities to come up with the necessary funds to bail them out.

 

Unfortunately, such a policy action is unlikely to materialise, on account of the government's precarious fiscal and financial position.

 

Finally, there is also a genuine concern relating to the long-term growth of the Thai economy.

 

The growth in GDP is largely attributable to the quantity and quality of labour input and investment or capital accumulation. In the case of Thailand, the investment in new plants and more productive machnery and equipment is the chief contributor to our GDP growth. As reported by a government agency, contribution by a rise in productivity remains rather limited. In this respect, an additional important statistic can give a broader and more relevant perspective: the average rate of economic growth of the past years since 1997 has been consistently below that of the similar interval leading up to the 1997 crisis.

 

This suggests that the Thai private sector has become more conservative and cautious about over-investing in the same reckless fashion as it did during the years prior to the 1997 crisis.

 

In this day and age, various countries strive for a high rate of growth and lower cost of production through an increase in productivity. Raise their competitive edge, to be precise. They recognise that the innovation and investment to raise productivity and competitiveness are today's only answer to tomorrow's sustainable growth.

 

Thailand is an open economy with exports making up roughly 60% of the GDP.

 

As our competitive edge used to lie in cheap labour, a factor which no longer holds true today, the country's relatively low rate of investment plus slow rise in productivity under the existing, competitive global conditions almost translates to dying a slow economic death. Other emerging countries will soon sweep past Thailand in the economic race to world markets.

 

The financial sector has, over the past several years, assumed a new complexion in its structure, organisation, and operation.

 

Since the 1997 financial crisis and the tragedy that followed, a number of local commercial banks and major non-bank financial institutions have fallen into foreign ownership. These foreign majority-owned financial institutions tend to follow modern banking principles and, more often than not, lend on the bases of project feasibility, management ability and good corporate governance, as opposed to traditional banking practices which tend to extend loans to borrowers on the basis of personal relationship and collateral-asset availability.

 

As a result, the existing financial system is characterised by a situation in which most large-scale enterprises with superior technical know-how, efficient and prudent financial management and operations, a strong financial position and accurate perception of the current and future economic and business outlook, generally find themselves needing less credit from financial institutions. This is despite the latter's willingness to lend to them as they are attracted by their appearance of efficiency and superior performance.

 

On the contrary, medium- and small-sized business find themselves less able to obtain additional credit for their cash-strapped operations. Potential lenders, with the exception of government-owned financial institutions, look unfavourably on their traditional-style management and operation and are unwilling to extend additional credit, be it asset-based or otherwise.

 

Another aspect of the financial system is that although technically these foreign majority-owned financial institutions are subject to the same regulation and supervision of the central bank, in practice, they are obligated to attain the objectives and follow the policy guidelines of their overseas parent banks.

 

Hence the existence of several foreign majority-owned financial institutions signifies a tacit understanding that the existing financial system has become less amenable to the central bank's control. As a result, monetary policy actions have been rendered less effective than previously.

 

The public sector is currently plagued with a wobbling fiscal position, an inevitable outcome of a weakening economy and declining tax revenues. Additionally, most of the state-owned banks and so-called semi-financial institutions have been seriously weakened by the financial burden imposed upon them by the previous government's free spending and giveaway campaigns.

 

The upshot is that fiscal policy is subject to a rigid constraint, as a severe limitation has been imposed upon them by the relative scarcity of fiscal and financial resources available.

 

Inflation has not been a serious threat over the past years, in spite of soaring energy prices and rises in transport and distribution costs. The situation could have been worse had it not been for the working of the strong exchange rate of the baht, which operates to prevent domestic energy prices from going up as high as they could, and would, have. Against the generally unpromising economic backdrop, this could almost be regarded as a bright spot.

 

Lately though, inflation has begun to rear its ugly head once again. The external sector is at present undergoing a painful experience of the strong-baht phenomenon.

 

The trouble with the strong baht is that it tends to make for a decline in our exports of goods and services and a rise in imports. This has the effect of depressing our domestic income, production, output and employment.

 

The reduction, in turn, leads to a fall in consumption and investment expenditure as a result of lower household income and business profitability, thus setting off further rounds of decline in income, production, output, employment, and consumption and investment, until the process finally comes to an end through the income-expenditure interacting mechanism.

 

This situation has been the outcome of many complex circumstances and an interplay of a host of variables. In the first place, we are being squeezed by a weak dollar as well as a weak yen. Historically, the dollar and the yen moved in opposite directions. As a result, the adverse effect of the former on the performance of our external sector, in terms of exports and imports, was usually and, to a large extent, negated by the latter, and vice versa.

 

Strangely, the current situation is one in which dollar is weak against the baht and the yen is weak against the dollar and also against the baht. So, conceptually, our exports are supposed to be discouraged while imports encouraged.

 

Fortunately, Japan's economy has been recovering from its lengthy doldrums. Its increasingly more robust economy has prevented the growth of our exports from decelerating as much as they would have.

 

Chet Chaovisidha is an economist, a former MP for Bangkok and an economic adviser to several past governments.

 

The final instalment of this article will be published tomorrow.

[kev0184 12]

interesting read, and some good points, dont agree with everything in there, but some harsh truths there.

[wacmedia 277]

Hi,

 

I dont know enough about the Thai economy to judge but it seems like they are blaming Thaksin for throwing money around to buy popularity. That may or may not be true. The main problem at the moment is their policies seem to be frightening off foreign investment and residents alike which will have a big effect. Maybe they are going to address that issue in the final article ?

[joekicker 53]

I dont know enough about the Thai economy to judge but it seems like they are blaming Thaksin for throwing money around to buy popularity.

 

Not to mention this year's early rains, the quality of nighttime TV shows and the rising incidence of skin cancer. It's fashionable and utterly crazy, but "Thaksin dunnit" is the national motto. It saves the current lot from having to look in the mirror. It's really hard to take a lot of the criticism seriously at all when it starts off something like, "of course the reason for the rise of the baht is the policies of Thaksin but the hard-working members of the military government... "

 

There IS quality analysis and background around, the print media is not all that badly intimidated as the broadcasters. But it's very hard to track it down. My litmus test is exactly what you say. If the first para says it's Thaksin's fault, I'm off to the next one.

[m_right 0]

I live in central Thailand now. I alternate between staying in the village and a small apartment in small town with air and internet. The village is dying. Most of the employable people are working in Bangkok. If a girl is the least bit saleable she works in bar in Pattaya, Puckett or Bangkok. Any money they can scrape together goes to pay interest to the bank on the family debt or buy lottery tickets.

The only families that have any hope are those that have a farang in the picture.

[joekicker 53]

I live in central Thailand now. I alternate between staying in the village and a small apartment in small town with air and internet. The village is dying. Most of the employable people are working in Bangkok.

 

One thing that Thaksin policies did was keep a HUGE percentage of people in the village instead of running off to Bangkok for seasonal (and xhitty) jobs. I'm no fan of populism, but some of the Thaksin programmes were very sustainable and very successful, Otop being one of them. "One tambon (village) one project" employed people, made money and helped the LOCAL economy of many villages. Of course, since it was Thaksin, it was a Bad Thing and gets no more funding or promotion. Still, a lot of the Otop villages are doing very well.

[Shilo 371]

The final part:

 

http://www.bangkokpost.com/News/09Jun2007_news24.php

 

 

Like small fish in a big pond

 

Thailand will simply have to do its best to cope with a difficult situation, brought about by the actions of major players on the economic scene like China, Japan and the United States

 

By CHET CHAOVISIDHA

 

After the 1997 global financial conflagration, several countries have become fearful of the spectre of another financial meltdown _ memories of the pain and hardship their economies went through during that time remain vivid. Understandably, since then most countries have been accumulating foreign exchange reserves with almost reckless abandon. China, in particular, has amassed foreign exchange reserves to the tune of over US$1 trillion.

 

Such an exorbitant amount of dollars in the hands of a single country _ and many more with substantial amounts in their foreign reserve portfolios _ naturally makes every other country with substantial dollar holdings jittery.

 

They realise that sooner or later China, faced with the continued prospect of further increases in foreign exchange reserves over the next few years, will relinquish part of these reserves and invest them in other forms of income-earning assets abroad (China actually has already done so recently, though on a relatively small scale) instead of keeping them in non-earning assets at its central bank.

 

When that occurs, especially on a substantial scale, these other countries will be faced with potentially huge losses on their own dollar holdings.

 

Thus various dollar-holders are impelled to diversify, or to be ready to diversify, their foreign reserve portfolios into overseas real and financial investment.

 

Also, they must always be on the alert for potential dollar-unloading action by other foreign dollar holders. This set of circumstances will exert a continuing downward pressure on the dollar to remain weak, so long as the above conditions remain intact.

 

Additional complications arise because even though Thailand's physical volume and dollar values of exports have increased, the nominal baht values have decreased, a consequence of conversion from the weak dollar to strong domestic currency. The upshot is that a certain proportion of local exporters and producers suffer a fall in profits and others have actually incurred losses. This will invariably trigger off a depressive effect on our economy through an income-induced decline in investment and consumption spending, eventually giving rise to a negative effect on employment, especially in the export and industrial sectors in the longer run.

 

The strong baht can be expected to stay with us for some time to come. The United States' continuing trade and current account deficits and weak dollar, its sluggish economy, struggling automobile industry and slumping property development and housing activities will continue to exert a contractionary influence on the United States' demand for Thai exports.

 

This condition normally should have served to weaken the baht but that has not happened because it is more than counter-balanced by more telling influences which pull the baht in the upward direction, as outlined earlier.

 

Furthermore, the yen is also likely to remain weak as Japan continues to pour a huge volume of investment into China and proceeds to import products thus produced in China as well as other Chinese-produced merchandise for Japan's domestic consumers.

 

As the Japan-China trade volume has been surging continuously over time and is expected to outstrip the Japan-United States transactions soon, it works to the advantage of the Japanese private sector to maintain a weak yen because under such a circumstance its exports to both the United States and China will keep expanding.

 

Since expectation is generally self-realising, predictably the self-serving actions of Japan's private sector will continue to keep the yen weak for the foreseeable future.

 

The conclusion here is that a persistently weak dollar and a comparatively even weaker yen will continue to bode ill for Thailand's external balance sheet and income statement, and make for a sustained strong baht.

 

There is also a further disturbing prospect for the baht, which is associated with oil money.

 

The high and rising price of crude over the past few years has flushed the oil-producing and exporting countries with an enormous amount of cash. The Gulf states have spent close to US$1 trillion on investment projects at home and have been shopping around for the best bargains and mopping up assets in the United States, their primary investment destination.

 

Now they are looking to further diversify their portfilios in the European Community markets and emerging markets in the Southeast Asian region.

 

In the process, some portion of this money will likely find its way into the hands of the hedge funds and other financial institutions which are well known for their perceived investment skills and speculative expertise, and which are always looking out for opportunities to make profits in any kind of market conditions.

 

To them the emerging markets in Southeast Asia present an opportunity that cannot be passed up _ most of these countries have attained relatively high rates of economic growth in recent years, with strong foreign reserve positions built up after the recovery from the 1997 financial crisis.

 

These countries boast securities markets with relatively small market capitalisations, as well as relatively unrestricted foreign exchange market transactions _ a condition which can be influenced by the hedge funds and the like, to secure financial gain. Their operation needs to be more subtle these days though, as they have to make allowance for the spontaneous corrective adjustment inherent in the flexible exchange rate system now practised by most of these countries.

 

The combination of direct investment from the Middle East oil-rich states and financial investment and speculation by international institutional investors is expected to, in the main, further strengthen the baht and, in the process, create more volatility and wider amplitude of fluctuations in the foreign exchange market.

 

As long as crude prices stay high, this scenario will endure and the foreign cash inflow will intensify.

 

For the time being, the oil cash and oil cash-related inflows have been going on in trickles. When this inflow will hit us on a massive scale, with either investment or speculative motives, and how detrimental it will be to the Thai economy, remains to be seen. Meanwhile, we should be making plans to cope with this possible eventuality.

 

If one has to rank these weaknesses and problems according to their severity and intractability, the top three on the list would be the ''household debts'', ''strong baht'' and ''slow improvement in productivity in the agricultural and industrial sectors'', though not necessarily in that order.

 

The reason is that although the impact of each factor on the economy is different, all these factors possess important common characteristics with respect to policy actions.

 

The first two are relatively unamenable to corrective policy actions. In one case, the potentially effective remedial measure is constrained by insufficient fiscal and financial resources available, and the other is subject to an interplay of external circumstances, predominantly uncontrollable by us.

 

As for the third, it is a long-term imbalance which has to do with scores of structural and institutional factors, needing changes and reforms, such as improvement in education, logistics, communication, transportation, port facilities, beaureaucratic machinery, etc. In effect, these problems and imbalances are likely to persist over time.

 

And Thailand will just have to do its best to cope with such a difficult situation.

 

The Constitution Tribunal's recent verdict may have served to clear up political uncertainty and curb the perception of economic risks to a certain extent. Still, the basic economic weaknesses and problems remain and demand effective policy actions.

 

Chet Chaovisidha is an economist, a former MP for Bangkok, and an economics adviser to several past governments.

 

This instalment concludes the three-part article; the first two were published consecutively on June 7 and 8, 2007.

[CheshireTom 1,377]

Not to mention this year's early rains, the quality of nighttime TV shows and the rising incidence of skin cancer. It's fashionable and utterly crazy, but "Thaksin dunnit" is the national motto. It saves the current lot from having to look in the mirror. It's really hard to take a lot of the criticism seriously at all when it starts off something like, "of course the reason for the rise of the baht is the policies of Thaksin but the hard-working members of the military government... "

 

There IS quality analysis and background around, the print media is not all that badly intimidated as the broadcasters. But it's very hard to track it down. My litmus test is exactly what you say. If the first para says it's Thaksin's fault, I'm off to the next one.

 

Joe,

 

Yep, blame Thaksin. Nine months after the coup and they still haven't managed to come up with anything criminal to actually pin on him other than rumour and innuendo.

[joekicker 53]

Yep, blame Thaksin. Nine months after the coup and they still haven't managed to come up with anything criminal to actually pin on him other than rumour and innuendo.

 

I'm going to get a lot of money around the end of the year when the jail population increase stands at zero. I made a lot of bets on that, and I was/am very confident. Actually, in Thakin's personal case I don't think he did anything they can pin on him anyhow. This land deal stinks, but fact is they paid four times the asking price - and he wasn't even in the government when it happened back in the last century. He hasn't avoided a baht of taxes. In court, I'm convinced he'd walk out a free man. I doubt it will come to that, but if it does get ready for riot city.

 

But all his cronies and hangers-on and criminal associates might as well be sitting in a church, they are so safe.

 

In fairness to the thugs currently "running" the country, they just can't afford to put anyone away, because if they do, THEY will be put away not too far down the line. This is the really ugly part of Thailand, where the billionaires fight the multi-millionaires for control. Everyone gets to do it for a while, though - that's the point of it. The rest of us hunker down because "when elephants fight the grass gets trampled".

 

Thailand has come so close to just throwing out the scum and getting down to the business of running the country in the past 44 years, it just makes me cry.

 

Speaking of quality analysis:

http://www.upiasiaonline.com/human_rights/...is_insincerity/

Edited June 9, 2007 by joekicker

[CheshireTom 1,377]

Thailand has come so close to just throwing out the scum and getting down to the business of running the country in the past 44 years, it just makes me cry.

 

Joe,

 

Unfortunately, Thaksin's biggest fault/crime seems to be that given a democratic general election he would get re-elected again.

 

I agree with your assessment though ....... the clock is ticking for the current rulers and they're not about to make things as easy by taking a convenient trip abroad (I noticed on Thursday that even the Post has started referring to them as "the dictatorship").

[joekicker 53]

I agree with your assessment though ....... the clock is ticking for the current rulers and they're not about to make things as easy by taking a convenient trip abroad (I noticed on Thursday that even the Post has started referring to them as "the dictatorship").

 

One of three things I said on Sept 19 is that the junta commander Sonthi should start immediately figuring out how many Thais he will kill in the riots before he steps down. Because he will.

 

The other two were that no advance would be made in democracy because everyone in the "government" and the junta would be fixated on trying to PREVENT the return of Thaksin - and no one would be punished even though the primary reason for the coup was to punish them.

 

I have zero sympathy for these violent, stupid, abusive military people. I just feel sorry for the ones they will kill before they are put down yet again - to retire into a life of luxury of course like the last lot (Suchinda). And now the other general Chavalit who laughed at the fall of the baht and a 5 year depression he caused, probably is coming back! Full honours!

[MM 6,562]

I know some of us have strong opinions on the current political state of Thailand, but I'm going to have to ask you to try to avoid characterizing the current regime in a derogatory fashion.

 

I do consider the politics of Thailand relevant to the membership and Pattaya, but because the current political administration is a military junta with broad powers, I'd prefer not to be holding the bag if someone gets their panties in a twist because of something someone said on here.

 

Thanks.

[touristman 1]

my comments curtailed, i will just say 'fair play Shilo' it was indeed a very interesting post.

 

Tough times lie ahead, for most nations IMHO, with 'globalisation' continuing unabeted.

[BigDUSA 71]

Interesting analysis. One of the reasons, I plan on renting a house/condo instead of buying. If things go tits up much easier and far less costly to head to the airport/border and leave.

[joekicker 53]

Interesting analysis. One of the reasons, I plan on renting a house/condo instead of buying. If things go tits up much easier and far less costly to head to the airport/border and leave.

 

BigD, TU is a recurring feature of Thailand, not a threat - 1973, 1976, 1992 just being the big ones. There's a lot of fighting in downtown Bangkok for a week, investors are scared for two months. The people who take over are exactly like the people they overthrew. There is currently no one/group on Earth that will cause Thai policy to change so that you'd notice. It's not like the commies are going to take over any more.

Edited June 10, 2007 by joekicker

[BigDUSA 71]

BigD, TU is a recurring feature of Thailand, not a threat - 1973, 1976, 1992 just being the big ones. There's a lot of fighting in downtown Bangkok for a week, investors are scared for two months. The people who take over are exactly like the people they overthrew. There is currently no one/group on Earth that will cause Thai policy to change so that you'd notice. It's not like the commies are going to take over any more.

 

 

With all the available cheap housing why should an elderly guy have a substantial amount of capital tied up in real estate in a country with a history of unstable governments?

 

Speaking only for myself, I'm 60 y/o and don't need or want the hassle of investing in the stock market or buy new property in a foreign country where the government barely tolerates foreigners.

 

FWIW when I speak about the hassle of investing in the stock market, I'm talking about all the research, I need to do to invest wisely. I don't need or want to spend the time investing.

Edited June 11, 2007 by BigDUSA

[joekicker 53]

With all the available cheap housing why should an elderly guy have a substantial amount of capital tied up in real estate in a country with a history of unstable governments?

 

Up to you of course, but the point is as you say that the *governments* have been unstable, not the country.

 

The reason to have real estate is to save rent and have an asset, not that I'm giving you any news. Naturally each person acts in his own interest, and I'm not trying to convince you of anything. My minor (maybe) point was just saying that Thailand is as solid as anything gets, whatever the shakiness of any individual regime.

[BigDUSA 71]

Up to you of course, but the point is as you say that the *governments* have been unstable, not the country.

 

The reason to have real estate is to save rent and have an asset, not that I'm giving you any news. Naturally each person acts in his own interest, and I'm not trying to convince you of anything. My minor (maybe) point was just saying that Thailand is as solid as anything gets, whatever the shakiness of any individual regime.

 

 

It's only an asset if you can sell it and that may be difficult to do if your on the way to the border and your in a hurry.

 

Thailand is not as solid as S'pore, OZ, NZ, US, EU. Unstable government equals much higher risk for someone buying a condo.

[joekicker 53]

It's only an asset if you can sell it and that may be difficult to do if your on the way to the border and your in a hurry.

 

Haven't made my point, obviously. No one ever has gone to the border. 17 coups, a (brief) Vietnamese invasion, four serious street revolutions and some others, hundreds dead -- It only happens at the very, very pointed end of the stick and in four days everything back's to normal.

 

But I'm adamant I'm not trying to sell you anything, or ON anything either. Just making *a* point and there's lots to consider before you start dumping bucks into Bangkok.

[BigDUSA 71]

Haven't made my point, obviously. No one ever has gone to the border. 17 coups, a (brief) Vietnamese invasion, four serious street revolutions and some others, hundreds dead -- It only happens at the very, very pointed end of the stick and in four days everything back's to normal.

 

But I'm adamant I'm not trying to sell you anything, or ON anything either. Just making *a* point and there's lots to consider before you start dumping bucks into Bangkok.

 

 

You made your point and as an old geezer who's investing days are behind him, I'd rather keep my assets off shore and pay rent. BTW thank God for the guys who are willing to buy a condo/house and rent them out to guys like me.

[monkeyman 1,604]

I reckon global warming's to blame.

[Shilo 371]

Another interesting read.... related to the value of the baht.

 

http://www.matthewsfunds.com/about_asia/on_asia.cfm

 

 

Baht and Sold

 

Andrew T. Foster, Director of Research, Portfolio Manager

Matthews International Capital Management, LLC

 

Toward the end of February 1997, a small article was carried in financial newspapers across the Asian region. The headline announced that a Thai company called Somprasong Land1 was set to default on its repayment of foreign currency-denominated debt. Somprasong was a mid-sized finance company specializing in the Thai real estate market. Though many had not heard of the company before, news of the default was not surprising: Thai finance companies were notorious for their aggressive financial dealings, and thus it was hardly shocking that a smaller player might have been overwhelmed in Thailand's speculative property markets. Readers generally took the news in stride, given that Thai property markets had created such wealth and growth over the prior decade. While most newspapers acknowledged the story, it was hardly front page news; the details of the default were generally buried in the middle of the paper.

 

 

 

Yet what began as a seemingly small, isolated event quickly broadened into one of the most severe financial panics in modern history. Somprasong would prove to be a "canary in the coalmine" for the currency crisis that spread across Asian markets during the summer of 1997. Shortly after Somprasong's default, nearly every other Thai finance company declared bankruptcy, thereby forcing the country's central bank to arrange an impromptu $8 billion bailout for the industry. Yet confidence was deeply shaken. In early July, a run on the baht forced Thai authorities to abandon the currency's long-standing "pegged" exchange rate. The baht crashed, losing more than 50% of its value versus the dollar in a matter of months. Financial and economic collapse ensued, engulfing not only Thailand but the entire region.

 

A decade later, Asia's economic health is markedly improved. Many pundits predicted that the region would be mired in recession for a decade or more; in reality Asia's growth only faltered for two years. While the crisis is by no means forgotten, the region has since enjoyed a period of sustained prosperity that has increased household incomes and boosted national wealth. The latter is particularly visible in Asia ex-Japan's accumulation of foreign currency reserves.2 Nations that were once deemed to be permanent debtors are now some of the world's largest creditors, having stockpiled well over $2 trillion in reserves. And like the rest of the region, Thailand's economy and markets have largely recovered from the darkest days of 1997. The baht, once a battered and bruised currency, has experienced slow but steady gains versus the dollar.

 

In fact, the baht's persistent strength has given rise to a great irony in financial markets: Thailand recently imposed capital controls so as to discourage its currency from strengthening too much. This strategy would seem inconsistent with past policies, as Thailand's leadership avoided closing off its capital markets during even the darkest hours of the Asian currency crisis. Their choice was not without cost, as hindsight suggests that some market participants—including some foreign parties—may have exacerbated Thailand's crisis in 1997. Yet the country's commitment to open and free markets was critical to restoring both confidence and growth, and Thailand now enjoys a stronger, sounder economy as a result.

 

So why did the country briefly impose capital controls in December 2006, when the baht's value was rising? Shouldn't Thailand be loathe to intervene in its currency markets, given its experience after the 1997 crisis? Why wouldn't Thailand enjoy the baht's strength, much as it suffered from the currency's decline? The answers to these questions are neither clear nor straightforward. Some might pin the move on Thailand's political landscape: the country has recently undergone a coup (thankfully, a bloodless one). It is possible the ruling junta wished to assert its control over the country's finances via tighter management of the baht—yet that explanation is only a partial one at best.

 

Thailand's difficulties are symptomatic of a much broader problem in Asia ex-Japan: namely, the difficulty of managing an open, independent currency in a small, open economy. In recent years, much of Asia has seen substantial inflows of "hot money" speculating on rapid currency appreciation—and nearly every government in the region has intervened in its respective currency market to prevent such uncontrolled, unbalanced appreciation. Thailand stands out only because its reaction was more extreme than most.

 

The core of Asia's problem stems from the lack of a unified currency policy, or at least a de-facto standard. For many years, the U.S. dollar served as the region's de-facto currency standard. Asian countries were happy to peg their currencies to the dollar, either explicitly or implicitly, in order to enjoy the monetary stability and trade relationships that followed. Particularly important was the access to capital that dollar pegs afforded. Even though few market participants were willing to lend long-term in baht, won or rupiah, companies could still borrow in dollar bond markets. The premise was that currencies would hold stable on the back of the dollar pegs—an assumption that collapsed under the weight of Somprasong and the currency crisis that followed after it.

 

Yet now that the dollar pegs have largely been severed, nothing has emerged to replace them. Asia's smaller currency markets still suffer from the lack of properly developed bond markets, which in turn hobbles the growth and stability of every company doing business in these markets. Meanwhile, China's emergence in the region has fundamentally reshaped the economic landscape. Most Asian countries now find that their economic destinies are deeply intertwined with that of China. China is now South Korea's largest trading partner, and China is poised to surpass the U.S. as Japan's largest trade relationship. Yet China's ascendance has only complicated the situation further. Its currency (the yuan) is not yet freely traded outside China's borders; thus Asian companies that would like to borrow yuan to offset their exports are thwarted. Many Asian currencies are consequently trapped between a rock and a hard place: the dollar is a diminished haven, and no other Asian currencies are strong enough or liquid enough to serve as a surrogate. The region's currency markets remain small and isolated, unable to provide stable, long-term capital, and easily swamped by large flows of short-term, "hot" money.

 

In this context, Thailand's flirtation with capital controls is perhaps more understandable, while still not welcome. Yet even capital controls will not solve the region's central problem: its currency and capital markets desperately need more breadth, depth and liquidity. Piggybacking on the dollar was a failed undertaking. Short of substantial change in China's currency regime, the region must achieve a higher level of coordination—and happily, Asian leaders are tentatively moving in that direction. When gathered at a recent economic roundtable, Asian leaders pledged to pool a portion of their $2 trillion in foreign reserves to promote greater currency stability. Details on the plan are lacking, and the story has not yet generated much excitement. In fact, few newspapers felt the story deserved to be treated as front page news—perhaps not unlike the lone default of a small Thai company that occurred a decade ago.

 

June 11, 2007

 

1 As of 3/31/07, Matthews Asian Funds did not hold any positions in Somprasong Land.

 

2 China, Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, Philippines currently hold $2.2 trillion in foreign currency reserves. China holds $1.2 trillion of the $2.2 trillion total. Source: The Economist and various Asian central banks.

 

The view and information discussed in this article are as of the date of publication, are subject to change and may not reflect the writer's current views. The views expressed represent an assessment of market conditions at a specific point in time, are opinions only and should not be relied upon as investment advice regarding a particular investment or markets in general. Such information does not constitute a recommendation to buy or sell specific securities or investments vehicles.

[Shilo 371]

I'm sticking adding this link to this thread partly to share with others but mostly because I just don't want to loss the damn thing.... it's way to big for a copy and paste so I'm just adding the link for now.

 

http://www.readbangkokpost.com/business/mo...change_rate.php

 

 

There's some good stuff here.... but there's also a boatload of info. Christ, I've got a friggen MBA and I'm having trouble digesting all the info

 

 

Enjoy,

 

Shilo

[Shilo 371]

Here is another interesting read: It was written last Sept just after the coup...

 

Thailand

Downgrading GDP on Intensifying Uncertainty

Sept 21, 2006

 

Andy Xie (Hong Kong)

 

We are cutting our Thai GDP growth forecasts to 2.4% from 3.5% for 2H06 and to 4% from 4.5% for 2007, on intensifying uncertainty as a result of last night’s military coup. We see the political situation remaining unsettled for at least another year.

 

The Thai economy has already lost momentum due to high oil prices and rising interest rates. The case for a recovery was based on a revival of investment, which appears unrealistic now. We expect government investment to remain stalled and private investment to weaken further on worsening sentiment.

 

Fresh round of political uncertainty

 

Higher oil prices and interest rates have already hurt private consumption in Thailand. Private consumption growth slowed to 3.9% in 1H06 from 4.3% in 2H05 and 4.6% in 1H05. Sustained political uncertainty has led to weaker growth in both government expenditure and private investment. Overall domestic demand (ex-inventories) slowed to 4% in 1H06 from 7% in 2005. Export growth has also weakened.

 

Last night’s military coup has brought a fresh round of uncertainty to the political environment in Thailand. Although the leader of the coup, General Sonthi Boonyaratglin, has announced his intention to implement a quick transition to an interim government, we believe that the final outcome is far from clear. How long will it take to move towards a democratically elected government? Will there be an effective split or a complete splintering of TRT (Thai Rak Thai)? Moreover, the opposition party is not fully positioned to a form a full majority government on its own, considering its relatively poor reach in the rural parts of the country. How long will the constitutional amendment take? Who will assume interim leadership?

 

Slowdown likely to be prolonged

 

The military coup was not expected by the market at all. It appears that the market has systematically underestimated political risk in Thailand. We believe that the uncertainty could last through to 2007, severely affecting the macro outlook.

 

We see three potential scenarios for political developments going forward:

 

1. Stagflation (USD/THB at 40): The military puts together a series of ineffective and semi-legitimate governments as in the past. These governments are cobbled together with some known faces, but are not organized effectively to move the economy forward. Each government lasts a short period of time without effective governance. Business confidence continues to sink slowly. The economy goes into stagflation. Capital flight weighs on the baht, resulting in inflationary pressure and restraining the central bank from cutting interest rates. The economy is stuck with stagflation through to 2007. USD/THB is likely to trade at around 40 by end-2007.

 

2. Snap-back (USD/THB at 35): The military quickly organizes an election with the participation of all parties. A legitimate government is formed in early 2007. The TRT or another form of it is most likely the winner. Government-led investment gets back on track. The economy snaps back and, after pausing in 2H06, delivers 8% growth in 2007 on reviving capex. The central bank raises interest rates again. USD/THB falls to 35. Inflation falls to below 3%.

 

3. Chaos (USD/THB at 45): Mr. Thaksin’s supporters fight back. The provinces descend into chaos. Business confidence collapses and capex vanishes. Inflation spikes up to 10%. However, fearing for the economy, the central bank doesn’t raise interest rates. The Thai economy sinks into a vicious spiral of baht depreciation and rising inflation. Towards the end of 2007, the Bangkok middle classes stage a revolution to bring back democracy. USD/THB rises to 45.

 

We believe that the first scenario — i.e., stagflation — is the most likely outcome. The snap-back scenario would involve the TRT in one form or another. This would probably have happened without the coup. The staging of a coup suggests that the existing course of political development was unacceptable to the military. We think the ‘chaos’ scenario is unlikely for now as the Bangkok middle classes will most probably accept the situation for the time being, while the rural population has historically played little part in changing national politics.

 

Cutting our growth estimates for 2H06 and 2007

 

We were already building in a sharp deceleration in 2H06 GDP growth, to 3.5% from 5.5% in 1H06. We now lower our 2H06 growth estimate further, to 2.4%, as the fresh round of uncertainty looks set to further dampen consumer and business sentiment. We now expect private consumption growth to decelerate to 2.5% in 2H06, versus our previous estimate of 3.3%. We see households slowing down purchases of discretionary items (e.g., automobiles, restaurant services and other personal services) while still maintaining some growth in purchases of non-discretionary items (e.g., food and beverages). Similarly, we are cutting our private investment growth forecast to -0.4% from 3%.

 

Fixed investment growth experienced a sharp slowdown from double-digit levels in 1H05 to 5.2% in 1H06. The case for recovery was based on the removal of political uncertainty and commencement of a government-led investment push. However, considering the unsettled political situation, we think that government investment is unlikely to pick up any time soon. In addition, the increasing uncertainty is likely to discourage private investment. We do not anticipate investment growth in Thailand in 2H06.

 

Net exports recovered in 3Q06 and have been range-bound. Export growth is likely to weaken on a high base, but sluggish domestic demand and slower import growth should help maintain poor but positive growth in external demand.

 

We believe that the wild card for the 2H06 growth outlook is inventory. There was substantial de-stocking in 1H06, and some rebound is possible in 2H06. However, considering the level of political uncertainty, businesses are unlikely to stock up significantly in anticipation of better sales ahead.

 

We are also cutting our 2007 GDP growth estimate to 4%, versus 4.5% previously, based on our expectation of slower consumption and investment growth.

 

Long-term growth outlook worsens

 

We believe that the Thai economy has structural barriers to high growth, principally over-dependence on oil, poor infrastructure and lack of quality education for the poor. The country requires a powerful and effective government to drive investment and de-bottleneck the economy.

 

The military coup is not just a cyclical event — it signals weak governments ahead, in our view. Hence, the structural barriers to high growth are unlikely to be removed. As a result, we see a risk that the valuation of Thai assets may be lowered fundamentally.

 

 

Link to full piece: http://www.morganstanley.com/views/gef/arc...060921-Thu.html

 

.

[wacmedia 277]

There's some good stuff here.... but there's also a boatload of info. Christ, I've got a friggen MBA and I'm having trouble digesting all the info

 

Hi,

 

I agree with this statement and have had arguments with some Americans who say they are not worried by the weak $.

 

No country in the world can attain wealth through a weak currency, according to Atchana Waiquamdee, a deputy governor of the Bank of Thailand.

 

Hi,

 

The weakness of the $ has had the effect of strenghtening the Baht.

 

The trade deficit of the US with China which puts downward pressure on the US dollar.("Vichit Suraphongchai, the executive chairman of Siam Commercial Bank, said the massive capital flows that have come to Asia stemmed in part from the imbalances in the global market and the massive deficits run by the United States.")