CheshireTom

Not according to Ostrower, nor Aboulafia. Jeez, I can remember when you took great pleasure in quoting those two guys ....

OUCH 6 and 7! were subject to deep discounts.

That word 'IF' is a bit of a bastard, eh? Apparently not ... From your mate, John Ostrower .... The price of Boeing's 787 sales success By Jon Ostrower on December 21, 2010 Inside: - How the 787 backlog was built - Predicable costs at 787's foundation - Scott Carson's ascent - Can the 787-9 undo the damage? - Looking at 17 787's per month - The revival of the 787-10 - Redrawing the supply chain lines Data obtained by FlightBlogger show Boeing's historic order backlog for the 787 was based partly on steep discounts driven by now-discarded design and manufacturing assumptions. Cost overruns, penalty payments and supply chain changes adopted in the last two years will force Boeing to achieve unprecedented cost-savings for the widebody to turn a profit even after delivering the current 846-aircraft backlog. OUCH 1! With first delivery nearly three years behind schedule, the cost to build each 787 has skyrocketed from its original foundations built upon dramatically lower and more predictable production costs, say company insiders. In the race to sign up customers between 2004 and 2006, airframe prices averaged just below $76 million OUCH 2! , a price that does not include the the $20 to $30 million GENx or Rolls-Royce engines, Boeing furnished equipment (BFE) and in-flight entertainment (IFE), according to pricing data. While Boeing will never disclose the actual prices its mega-backlog of 787s were sold for, Jim Albaugh, CEO of Boeing Commercial Airplanes, believes the 787 was sold for far less than it was worth, as acknowledged in a recent interview: "I think we gave away some of the value of this airplane to a lot of our customers." OUCH 3! Though that statement, say customer and company sources, as well as industry analysts, is an understated acknowledgment that hints at how Boeing's 787 backlog was built; stimulated by not only by huge future growth in air traffic and precipitously rising fuel prices, but a steady and strategic drop in the price of the aircraft. Boeing, which did not comment on the actual pricing figures, says it is "constantly evaluating our value proposition in the marketplace. Prices are adjusted based on the value our products provide to our customers as well as our positioning in the competitive environment." In late 2004, Boeing started employing aggressive sales tactics, according to sources familiar with the pricing discussions, blunting the ambitions of the original Airbus A350, then a significantly upgraded A330. That aggressiveness, led by then sales vice president Scott Carson, with a mandate from then-CEO Harry Stonecipher, then-Commercial Airplanes Chief Alan Mulally and the Boeing board of directors, saw prices slashed on the company's composite jetliner. In the more than three and a half years since its first 787 began assembly, the prevailing wisdom about Boeing's woes have centered upon moving past manufacturing design issues, completing extensive rework of production airframes, certifying and delivering the first units for revenue service and building a steady industrial ramp up at its Everett and Charleston facilities; all while re-balancing its supply chain as it develops the 787-8's larger successor. Although each is a formidable task, the pricing data indicates Boeing also must overcome five-year-old pricing decisions on more than 300 787s still in the backlog. The 2004 through 2006 airframe prices charged to airline customers ranged between $83.5 million and as low as $65.7 million for the 787-8, OUCH 4! for one higher volume deal with a blue chip customer. Prices for the larger 787-9 were cut significantly as well, but the sales balance in the early years of the program was weighted heavily toward the smaller -8. There remains great risk and opportunity to ensure the 787 - the company's fastest selling jetliner - becomes the cash cow Boeing hopes it will become. Few doubt the market success of Boeing's flagship program, though the profitability and margins remain open questions as the recurring production costs, by the company's own admission, lack clarity. Boeing declined a request for executives currently leading the program, as well as Carson, though the company did comment on a point-by-point basis. Predictable costs at Dreamliner's heart The steadily lowered price for the Dreamliner was supported by the barebones production costs forecast by program planners who saw a global supply chain with its contractual prices locked in, as well as design and manufacturing responsibility and cost weighted toward Boeing's suppliers. The company's confidence in predicting its costs were derived from its own contractual agreements with suppliers on the cost of each shipset, and how much labor would be required on its own end once fully-stuffed structures arrived on the final assembly line in Everett. Boeing's supply chain model as formulated, say company insiders, allowed the estimate of its "snap together planes" to be built for and unprecedented low recurring cost which would be recognized early in the program as the production rate was set to hit 10 aircraft per month in 2010. This cost assumption, built upon a $5 billion investment for the 787, say industry sources, compared to the $11.5 billion initially budgeted for the 777, allowed Boeing to compete aggressively to establish the Dreamliner in the marketplace, ultimately obliterating the earliest incarnations of the A350. "If they win the order, who cares what the price is?" says Air Insight analyst Addison Schonland. "The price wasn't wrong, the cost was." Boeing's CFO, James Bell says it will be another three to four years before Boeing can anticipate if it will approach the profitability of the 777 and 737, the company's most mature and highest rate programs. "We would also have a real opportunity to see how the production system really works, because remember," says Bell, "this is a different production system than we used on building aluminum airplanes, and we anticipate that the learning curve on that we will be able to harvest sooner. But we won't know that until we start running them. "But by 2013, 2014, we will know. We would expect those margins to start to approach some of the production programs you see today." To ensure the poor pricing locked in on the first several hundred 787-8s don't significantly drop the company's quarterly reported profits, say many in the analyst community, Boeing is spreading out the poorly priced airframes over the delivery schedule in the decade to come, interspersed with better prices locked in with later customers. OUCH 5! Shifting poorly priced units farther along Boeing's "skyline" also allows a drop in the cost to build each 787 as the production rate accelerates. That acceleration, say factory sources, may extend well beyond today's 2013 goal to build 10 787s per month, with rises as high as 17 per month being investigated for mid-2016. That significant boost, beyond today's unprecedented target, which calls for the planned Everett surge line, which aims for operation by early 2012, to be made permanent. Speaking generally of the planned rate increases, Albaugh says: "Clearly you work with your supply chain to take cost out, you work throughput, you have more airplanes coming through with the same amount of invested capital, drives your unit cost down and drives profitability." Carson's Ascent Scott Carson's ascent to the top spot of Boeing Commercial Airplanes was directly attributable to his performance as vice president of sales, having presided over growth in the 787 backlog that far exceeded any sales campaign the company had ever seen, while taking advantage of significant market demand for jetliners. When he was first appointed vice president of sales for Boeing Commercial Airplanes in December 2004, replacing Toby Bright who was appointed shortly after 9/11 in January 2002, the 787 program had accumulated 52 orders, which included launch customers All Nippon Airways and Air New Zealand. Upon his appointment, Stonecipher laid out Carson's objectives in plain terms: "Scott's appointment will strengthen and improve our global sales effectiveness and that's one of our highest priorities." Carson faced not only a post-9/11 marketplace that had slowed the 787's market reception, but the company was reeling from high profile sales losses to Airbus including orders to Iberia, Air Berlin and easyJet. Boeing Commercial Airplanes CEO and president Alan Mulally, who now serves as CEO of Ford, had declared the 7E7 would accumulate 200 orders by the end of 2004, a goal the company did not achieve, resulting in the reassignment of Bright. During his tenure as vice president of sales, Carson, whose warm demeanor earned him respect inside the company and with customers, grew the 787 backlog by 330 airframes between his appointment in December 2004 and the naming of his successor in October 2006. In that period of less than two years, with a mandate from Mulally and Stonecipher, Carson racked up nearly three times as many orders for the 787 as the 777 did in the entire six-year period leading up to its 1995 entry into service. Carson's unprecedented success had a lot working in his favor, say industry sources, including a tepid market reception to the A350 mark one, an aluminum lithium update to the A330-200 and -300 with GEnx engines. However, while Airbus struggled to find its footing on the A350, a fierce sales battle emerged that saw Airbus lowering its price to account for its modest E3.5B investment, while Boeing countered with further lowered prices and increased production forecasts to best the then 2010 entry into service planned for the A350, now slated for 2013. Can a single aircraft type redeem a company? With just over three years to go before the first 270 to 290-seat 787-9 is handed over to Air New Zealand at the end of 2013, a date set to slip, the balance of the massive 787 backlog remains heavily tilted toward the smaller 220 to 250-seat 787-8, with 77% of the 846-aircraft backlog earmarked for the first model. That balance, says Albaugh, is set to shift. "I think what you'll see is a mix that is probably weighted a little bit to the -9 side," he said in an August interview. "The -8 fills a great niche for certain routes, certain customers it's going to be the airplane of choice. It really just depends on their route structure people want to fly. "I think when people see the value of the -9 you'll see a lot of people wanting that airplane, and we think that airplane is one we can sell for more than the -8 for sure." Though for Boeing to fortify the program's profitability, the shift to the larger 787-9, said CEO Jim McNerney in a February investor Q&A, is the company's "the single biggest opportunity." "If a customer comes to us and says instead of 25 787-8s," said McNerney, "We want 10 787-9s and 15 787-8s. Now that we see that you are going to deliver what you said on the 787-9, that is an opportunity for a discussion... they will be getting more value, we will be getting more price." The push to regain pricing power on the 787-8, which aims to cut its fuel burn by 20% compared to today's 767, is evident in the aircraft's changing list price, which debuted in August 2005 on Boeing's website for $125 to $135 million. Boeing says that price was in reference to catalogue pricing messaged in the early launch days of the program in comparison to the 767-300ER. The price today, again boosted on December 14, places the 787-8 average catalogue pricetag at $185.2 million, more than 40% higher than first envisaged. OUCH 6! That increase is compared to an average 19-22% jump in the price of the 777 and 767 over the same period, respectively. Additionally, the price of the 787-9 first appeared in May 2006 when Boeing displayed a $178.5 to $188 million and has risen today to average of $219.1 million. "The difference in price increase is to adjust the pricing relationship between the 787-8 and 787-9 to better reflect their relative size and capability. The increase is also a reflection of value the 787-8 will provide to customers," says Boeing. Customers ANA, Air China, Vietnam Airlines, Ethiopian Airlines have all converted a portion or all of their order to the larger -9. Major orders from Lufthansa and Air France/KLM remain outstanding, with the 787-9 believed to be Boeing's lead offering to each European mega carrier. The sales success Boeing enjoyed on the 787 may be a doubled-edged sword said Albaugh: "The fact that we're virtually sold out to the end of the decade, we can't supply this airplane to some of our premium customers, and quite frankly I'd like to sell these airplanes for what they're worth." The schedule for the 787-9 remains in great doubt, and program sources suggest the new program plan, expected before week's end, will have a bigger impact to the -9 than it does to the -8. Engineering resources for the larger 787-9 had increased early in the year as 787-8 flight test progressed, returning data that was fed into the design of the new jet. Boeing had planned to move 80% of its 787 staff to the -9, says one program source, though in recent months, the engineering requirements of the 787-8 to resolve late design issues has virtually starved the 787-9 of its resources in some units, pulling back those engineers to the -8 on a full-time basis. Additionally, Boeing confirms that it is "re-looking at the possibility" of the 787-10, a further stretch of the 787's fuselage to comfortably accommodate around 315-seats in three-classes. The 787-8 and -9 product development planners aim for those aircraft to be dominant on long and thin Pacific routes, while the the 787-10 would be intended for the thicker Atlantic and Pacific routes. The aircraft, as conceived today, would be a simple fuselage stretch of the -9 while offering a 6,500nm range, nullifying the performance of the Airbus A330-300. The goal, says those same sources, is to offer a higher priced 787, while adding a comparatively low-cost investment that grows the backlog with prices based on the revised industrial cost -9 assumptions. Boeing says discussions, both internally and with customers, "are all considered preliminary" and "no firm decisions about the airplane have been made. We discuss it from time to time with whomever is interested" and would "depend on market requirements." Redrawing the lines With enormous costs sunk into the program to rehabilitate its supply chain, as well as to rework, repair, reenforce and mature parts of the aircraft's design, Boeing hopes to use the 787-9 as a "do-over", says a company source, first getting manufacturing oversight of the design and global supply chain, incorporating the lessons accumulated with the early manufacturing tranche of 787-8s. The stretched 787-9 is first and foremost an opportunity to apply the hard-earned technical lessons learned on the 787-8. From a design perspective, that reflects Boeing's ambition to incorporate widespread design changes to lighten and optimize the airframe and further refine the aircraft's systems. From a manufacturing standpoint, the institutional knowledge earned by working with the 787-8 since 2007, aims to give Boeing a smoother ramp up in the 787-9's production with a leaner assembly process and an even more experienced workforce. From a supplier management standpoint, realigning the 787-9 supply base enables opportunities for renegotiation of the contracts on which the 787-8 were first based, while also - in some cases - bringing work in house. Boeing completed acquisitions of Vought and Alenia's Charleston facilities by December 2009, where aft fuselage fabrication and center fuselage integration takes place. Additionally, the airframer completed a more recent acquisition of Summit Aeronautic group, which makes the 787's door edge frames. Supplier sources say the company's share of the work is set to grow again. For example, for its troubled Alenia Aeronautica-built horizontal stabilizer, Boeing is looking to insource the 787-9's stabilizer to incorporate the architectural and aerodynamic design changes while being in direct cost control of its fabrication and assembly, say program sources. One year after Mike Carriker and Randy Neville took the 787-8 on its maiden three-hour flight into the overcast, rainy skies of Puget Sound, kicking off what appeared to be a near flawless flight test campaign, Boeing's 787 program finds itself at a near standstill. OUCH 7! The fleet, grounded by federal regulators, is limited to ground testing after the November 9 fire aboard ZA002. The global production system again awaiting word on how and when to proceed, its top US supplier moving the majority of staff to other programs, Everett unable to accomodate new airframes. Boeing's management, its customers and financial stakeholders, watch with keen interest to see if the airframer can guide itself out of the near term challenges to certify and deliver the 787, but also avoid its previous missteps as it develops the 787-9 and -10 and undo some of the damage the 787-8 could inflict on the company's bottom line.

And yet another "foot in gob" moment from Clueless in Philly ...

Fortunately, not as close as those on the Turkish Airlines 737NG.

Oops ... the BigD "Kiss of Death" strikes again. Al Jazeera

Quite. And do you remember what you said at the time ..... How to make a cunt of yourself without really trying.

LOL. Grounded in the US with so many ailments and unable to generate any cash. The 787 ain't much better either.

So you've been saying for the past four years.

It's particularly worrying that the story came from the pen of Dominic Gates at The Seattle Times. Normally, he either acts as Boeing's mouthpiece or puts out reports to soften-up the market before Boeing's own announcements.

Quite ....

Ooops ... again. From the Seattle Times ... Dreamliner's woes pile up By Dominic Gates Seattle Times aerospace reporter As Boeing prepares to announce yet another delay for the 787 Dreamliner — at least three months, possibly six or more — the crucial jet program is in even worse shape than it appears. The problems go well beyond the latest setback, an in-flight electrical fire last month that has grounded the test planes. A year after the airplane's first flight, the cascade of systems failures caused by that fire, as well as two major problems since summer with the 787's Rolls-Royce engine, have raised red flags with aviation regulators. A top Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) official 10 days ago warned Boeing that without further proof of the plane's reliability, it won't be certified to fly the long intercontinental routes that airlines expect it to serve. Meanwhile, on the production side, one veteran employee on the 787 said he's witnessing "the perfect storm of manufacturing hell." The global supply chain is at a standstill, and outside the Everett factory the rows of partly finished jets will take many months to complete. To deliver the 20 Dreamliners built since the six flight-test planes, mechanics will have to complete more than 100,000 tasks. Among the 787's lesser ongoing problems is "rain in the plane," the term used for heavy condensation dripping inside the jet's composite plastic fuselage. Yet that issue is piddling compared with the major flaws that have brought a wave of successive delays. "The purpose of flight tests is to find out what you did wrong," said a senior engineer who expects the 787 will ultimately prove successful. "But the amount of stuff we are finding is horrible. We shouldn't be dealing with this many issues this late in the program." With the Dreamliner nearly three years overdue — and a postponement of the mid-February target for first delivery expected to be announced by Christmas — analysts estimate Boeing's cost overruns at a staggering $12 billion or more. The head of the 787 program, Scott Fancher, conceded in an interview this past week that he and his team have "a tough job in front of us." "There's no doubt we've had a lot of challenges," Fancher said. "The development of a new airplane is hard, especially one with as much innovation as this." Costs soaring More than a dozen people who work on the Dreamliner or have some knowledge of the program's state were interviewed for this story. All were granted anonymity because Boeing doesn't permit employees to speak publicly about its internal problems. Boeing has bet its future on the 787, which made its maiden flight one year ago. The company aimed to reduce the cost and risk by outsourcing an unprecedented share of manufacturing and design work to partners around the globe. It's the first new Boeing jet in more than 15 years, and the first airliner built largely from light, tough carbon-fiber-reinforced composite plastic. And it's been a marketing blockbuster: Despite a total of 120 cancellations, Boeing still has 846 orders. Yet the 787 has run into more trouble than any previous Boeing jet. The company's original internal target for its own development costs was $5 billion. But with yet another delay, several Wall Street analysts estimate that fixing the litany of manufacturing problems, plus paying penalties to suppliers and airlines, has piled on an additional $12 billion to $18 billion. The 20 built but incomplete Dreamliners sitting in Everett are emblematic of all that has gone wrong. They are so far from done that the total number of unfinished jobs exceeds 105,000. Counting further rework planned after some of the jets are flown to San Antonio, Texas, for refurbishment before delivery, the tally of incomplete jobs is more than 140,000. "Some jobs take a day, some take weeks," said a worker dealing with the backlog. Boeing is reworking six partly finished jets at a time, two of them in an empty bay inside the factory, two in a hangar at the south end of Paine Field, and two more on the flight line. Mechanics can complete only about 500 jobs a month out on the field, and perhaps 1,000 jobs a month on those inside the factory, the person said. These jets have no seats or sidewalls, and many interior systems are missing or incomplete. Passenger doors are missing. Mechanics installed temporary air-conditioning units after those fitted initially kept failing. Horizontal tails poorly built by Alenia in Italy are still being reworked. With the workmanship on the tails varying from one plane to the next, mechanics have to painstakingly customize the fixes plane by plane. (That headache at least produced one piece of good 787 news for this region. Alenia will still build 787 tails, but as Boeing ramps up beyond seven planes a month, it plans to build the additional tails in the Puget Sound area, possibly at its parts-manufacturing plant in Auburn, according to employees.) Despite the attention focused on achieving the first delivery, the manufacturing quagmire suggests that Boeing will be slow to deliver the next few dozen planes. "Hopping around" With its parked Dreamliners many months from completion, Fancher said Boeing is likely to skip over earlier planes that need more work and move up the delivery of some later-built, more completed jets. "You may see us hopping around a bit," he said, adding that it's a matter of balancing the most efficient way to finish the work with the customers' need to get a specific jet by a specific date. The worker dealing with the backlog puts it differently: "They've dug a hole so deep, they have no choice but to go around it and leave the hole there." On Boeing's 747, 767 and 737NG programs, parts shortages and late redesigns on early planes also stacked up dozens of incomplete jets on the flight line. But the company worked through those stacks without skipping over a significant number of deliveries. Meanwhile, the flight tests have brought new design problems to light. After runway tests in Roswell, N.M., in September, four Rolls-Royce engines had to be swapped out from the flight-test airplanes. According to a person familiar with the problem, mechanics discovered cracking of small blades called airfoils in one of the engine's compressors. GE and Rolls both provide 787 engines, but the Rolls engine will power most of the early Dreamliners. A separate and more serious incident occurred a month earlier, when a Rolls engine blew up on a ground test stand in England, sending metal pieces shooting out of the engine casing. Another person with knowledge of that event said an investigation afterward revealed that one of the engine shafts can, under certain conditions, turn too fast. That may not have caused the blowup, but it is out of compliance with FAA regulations. Rolls is testing hardware and software changes to solve the problem, though it hasn't won approval from the regulatory agencies. Company spokesman Josh Rosenstock said Rolls is convinced the engine will pass muster with the FAA in time for Boeing's delivery schedule. However, the engine modifications, plus an electrical system redesign needed as a result of the in-flight fire last month, will add to the glut of out-of-sequence work in the jets already built. FAA issues Worse, the engine and electrical issues have also raised crucial questions late in the program about the plane's reliability, potentially affecting regulators' certification of the airplane. Earlier this month, John Hickey, the FAA's deputy associate administrator for aviation safety, visited Seattle and warned 787 executives that in the current state of the program, the jet cannot be certified for long-distance transocean and transpolar flights, according to a person familiar with the details. Boeing designed and marketed the 787 as an ultra-long-range jet, and its customers are counting on that capability from the moment the plane enters service. But the 787 wouldn't be allowed to fly more than 60 minutes from the nearest airport without the certification known as ETOPS, for Extended-range Twin-engine Operational Performance Standards. That would drastically curtail the use of the jet for many airlines, including launch customer All Nippon Airways of Japan. Hickey, a former Boeing engineer, put Boeing on notice that to get an early ETOPS rating the company will have to do more to demonstrate the plane's reliability, including specifically the reliability of the engine and electrical systems. Dreamliner chief Fancher confirmed the recent meeting with the FAA over ETOPS and acknowledged that engine and electrical system reliability were discussed. But he said that such meetings about the FAA's certification requirements are "typical," and that Boeing will "fully address their concerns." Also drawing separate FAA scrutiny is repeated poor-quality workmanship in the 787 fuel tank, including issues with fasteners, said the person familiar with the FAA visit. That problem reaches back into the 787 supply pipeline, which continues to stutter. Suppliers go slow In November, for the fourth time this year, Boeing stopped moving planes forward on its final assembly line and halted deliveries of the major sections to Everett. Just one airplane had come off the line since the previous line stoppage in October. Fancher said the line halts are part of his "balancing act" to allow some suppliers to catch up with others and to slow the flow onto Paine Field of new planes needing to have the latest fixes applied. Despite the slowdown, he said, the supply chain is improving. Fancher cited "solid progress" at Boeing Charleston, which makes the 787's rear end. He conceded that Alenia of Italy "definitely remains a challenge." The other partners and the final-assembly team in Everett are "coming down the learning curve nicely," he said. For now, though, the pipeline is still blocked. Spirit AeroSystems of Wichita, Kan., which makes the Dreamliner's forward section, has reassigned most of its 787 work force until work picks up again. And though in recent years Boeing's 787 employees have worked through most of the Christmas holidays to catch up, a worker at Boeing Charleston said that plant this year will largely shut down its production lines. The latest delay will at least give engineers more time to test design fixes, including some for less consequential troubles, not uncommon on new jets, such as the maddening drip, drip, drip of "rain in the plane." On 787 flight tests, drip trays padded with squares of absorbent cloth are positioned to collect the condensation. Fancher said "a good design fix" to dehumidify the interior is being installed and will be tested when the Dreamliners resume flying. Employees working on the 787 complain about insufficient oversight of suppliers and a management system that the senior engineer called "totally broken." "This program is not like anything we've seen," said the veteran 787 employee. "It's a screwed-up mess." Yet Fancher said the feedback he receives is that employees are "proud to be part of an adventure like this." He insists his team will surmount all the problems. "This is a great airplane. It will deliver on the promises," Fancher said. "Our job is to get it over the goal line." Dominic Gates: 206-464-2963 or dgates@seattletimes.com

It's not their status within FIFA that concerns them, but their status on the IFAB - which FIFA would dearly love to have revoked for obvious reasons. IFAB

The government withdrew the funding. Nothing to do with smart moves at Boeing.

... in some cases. If you use a consolidated search engine, such as Hotels Combined , in the first instance, it will show agoda's rates including tax and service.

Jeez ... another xenophobic idiot.

It's being advertised as 2k plus tax, plus service (2.5k net), but it's not available. It's 4.5k plus tax, plus service on the 19th, and 8k plus, plus from the 20th onwards.

You've lost me. What has Renault got to do with Airbus?

Do you have a link to where it's (still) being advertised at 2k per night? The soft opening rate (which was available at the end of November) was 2k ++ (2.5k net), valid to Dec 19th but, as I said, that offer has been and gone and the hotel is full between now and the 19th. The 2.5k net was good value.

Lucky you! It's your big chance! Lufthansa flying to New York with the A380 December 15, 2010 John-F.-Kennedy-Airport the fourth Airbus A380 destination Big Bird flying to Big Apple! Lufthansa is planning to operate flights from Frankfurt to New York’s JFK International Airport with its new A380 flagship from 18 February. Following delivery of the fifth A380 (registration D-AIME, “Mike Echo“), Lufthansa will be using it initially for twice-weekly flights (Mondays and Fridays) to replace the Boeing 747 and Airbus A330 long-haul jets on the existing LH 400/401 city-pair flights. At the same time, the world’s biggest passenger plane will be flying the Frankfurt-Johannesburg connection daily expected from 15 February. Lufthansa is planning to increase A380 frequencies to New York step by step up to daily transatlantic services with the new flagship between Frankfurt and New York, probably by mid-April.

Which airline did you travel on?

Good stuff! Just like the WC in Qatar.

Hey, if you're unable to manage your own account .... Didn't BigD post the info a week or more ago as part of one of his regular xenophobic rants? And what's wih the Flying Citroen nonsense? Citroen has nothing to do with Airbus.

Have you got a link to the offer? 2k per night in December is a bit of a bargain. Edit: OK, sussed it. There was a 2k ++ soft opening offer which was available a couple of weeks ago but has since been and gone.